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Social Network Analysis and Mining (SNAM) techniques have drawn significant attention in the recent years due to
the popularity of online social media. With the advance of Web 2.0 and SNAM techniques, tools for aggregating,
sharing, investigating, and visualizing social network data have been widely explored and developed. SNAM is
effective in supporting intelligence and law enforcement force to identify suspects and extract communication
patterns of terrorists or criminals. In our previous work, we have shown how social network analysis and
visualization techniques are useful in discovering patterns of terrorist social networks. Attribute to the advance of
SNAM techniques, relationships among social actors can be visualized through network structures explicitly and
implicit patterns can be discovered automatically. Despite the advance of SNAM, the utility of a social network is
highly affected by its d completeness. Missing edges or nodes in a social network will reduce the utility of the
network. For example, SNAM techniques may not be able to detect groups of social actors if some of the
relationships among these social actors are not available. Similarly, SNAM techniques may overestimate the distance
between two social actors if some intermediate nodes or edges are missing. Unfortunately, it is common that an
organization only have a partial social network due to its limited information sources. In public safety domain, each
law enforcement unit has its own criminal social network constructed by the data available from the criminal
intelligence and crime database but this network is only a part of the global criminal social network, which can be
obtained by integrating criminal social networks from all law enforcement units. However, due to the privacy
policy, law enforcement units are not allowed to share the sensitive information of their social network data. A
naive and yet practical approach is anonymizing the social network data before publishing or sharing it. However, a
modest privacy gains may reduce a substantial SNAM utility. It is a challenge to make a balance between privacy
and utility in social network data sharing and integration. In order to share useful information among different
organizations without violating the privacy policies and preserving sensitive information, we propose a
generalization and probabilistic approach of social network integration in this paper. Particularly, we propose
generalizing social networks to preserve privacy and integrating the probabilistic models of the shared information
for SNAM. To preserve the identity of sensitive nodes in social network, a simple approach in the literature is
removing all node identities. However, it only allows us to investigate of the structural properties of such
anonymized social network, but the integration of multiple anonymized social networks will be impossible. To
make a balance between privacy and utility, we introduce a social network integration framework which consists of
three major steps: (i) constructing generalized sub-graph, (ii) creating generalized information for sharing, and (iii)
social networks integration and analysis. We also propose two sub-graph generalization methods namely, edge
betweenness based (EBB) and K-nearest neighbor (KNN). We evaluated the effectiveness of these algorithms on the
Global Salafi Jihad terrorist social network.* Correspondence: chris.yang@drexel.edu
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Social Network Analysis and Mining (SNAM) techni-
ques have drawn significant attention in the recent years
due to the popularity of online social media. With the
advance of Web 2.0 and SNAM techniques, tools for ag-
gregating, sharing, investigating, and visualizing social
network data have been widely explored and developed.
SNAM is effective in supporting intelligence and law en-
forcement force to identify suspects and extract commu-
nication patterns of terrorists or criminals. In our
previous work [1-3], we have shown how social network
analysis and visualization techniques are useful in disco-
vering patterns of terrorist social networks. Attribute to
the advance of SNAM techniques, relationships among
social actors can be visualized through network struc-
tures explicitly and implicit patterns can be discovered
automatically.
Despite the advance of SNAM, the utility of a social
network is highly affected by its d completeness. Missing
edges or nodes in a social network will reduce the utility
of the network. For example, SNAM techniques may not
be able to detect groups of social actors if some of the
relationships among these social actors are not available.
Similarly, SNAM techniques may overestimate the dis-
tance between two social actors if some intermediate
nodes or edges are missing. Unfortunately, it is common
that an organization only have a partial social network
due to its limited information sources. In public safety
domain, each law enforcement unit has its own criminal
social network constructed by the data available from
the criminal intelligence and crime database but this
network is only a part of the global criminal social net-
work, which can be obtained by integrating criminal so-
cial networks from all law enforcement units. However,
due to the privacy policy, law enforcement units are not
allowed to share the sensitive information of their social
network data. A naïve and yet practical approach is an-
onymizing the social network data before publishing or
sharing it. However, a modest privacy gains may reduce
a substantial SNAM utility. It is a challenge to make a
balance between privacy and utility in social network
data sharing and integration.
In order to share useful information among different
organizations without violating the privacy policies and pre-
serving sensitive information, we propose a generalization
and probabilistic approach of social network integration in
this paper. Particularly, we propose generalizing social net-
works to preserve privacy and integrating the probabilistic
models of the shared information for SNAM. To preserve
the identity of sensitive nodes in social network, a simple
approach in the literature is removing all node identities.
However, it only allows us to investigate of the structural
properties of such anonymized social network, but the inte-
gration of multiple anonymized social networks will beimpossible. To make a balance between privacy and utility,
we introduce a social network integration framework which
consists of three major steps: (i) constructing generalized
sub-graph, (ii) creating generalized information for sharing,
and (iii) social networks integration and analysis. We also
propose two sub-graph generalization methods namely,
edge betweenness based (EBB) and K-nearest neighbor
(KNN). We evaluated the effectiveness of these algorithms
on the Global Salafi Jihad terrorist social network.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we review the existing works about privacy preservation
of social network. Previous techniques are classified
based on their assumption of attack models the defin-
ition of sensitive information, and the privacy preserva-
tion techniques. In section 3, we introduce the researchd
framework. Social network generalization and integra-
tion techniques are introduced in section 4. The experi-
ment design, results and discussions are presented in
section 5. We conclude our work and introduce future
work in section 6.Related work
Sensitive information of social network
Given a social network, the definition of sensitive infor-
mation depends on the specific applications. In the lit-
erature, the social network sensitive information can be
classified into node properties, neighborhood graphs,
edge properties, and network properties in general.Node properties
In a social network, identity of nodes can be an import-
ant type of sensitive property [4-7]. A node with sensi-
tive identity means that its identity is private and should
not be released. On the other hands, a node with in-
sensitive identity means that the identity of this node
can be released with no harm. Another type of sensitive
property of a node can be its degree centrality [8-12].
Given a node, the degree centrality equals to the total
number of edges connecting to this node, which is the
number of friend in a social network. In a directed
graph, edges can be further divided into in-links and
out-links. Releasing the degree centrality of a given node,
attacker can find out the number of nodes associated to
this node which may further release its identity.Neighborhood graphs
Node neighborhood graph is a concept highly related to
degree centrality but with some differences [12]. Given a
node and its neighbors, how these neighbors connect
with each other can be unique. Publishing the neighbor-
hood graph of a node may release the identify of this
node.
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Besides the properties of network nodes, Zheleva and
Getoor also studied some sensitive properties related to
network edges[13]. Two types of information of an edge
can be potential sensitive information. One is the exist-
ence of an edge between two given nodes. The other is
the label of a given edge which represents the type of
relationship.
Network properties
Social network data has a set of important properties
which can be considered as sensitive information in
some cases, such as diameter, radius, betweenness, close-
ness, clustering coefficient etc.
Social network privacy attack model
To have a better protection against privacy attack, it is
important to understand different types of privacy attack
models. In this section, we introduce two categories of
attack, active and passive attacks [11,14].
Active attacks
Backstorm et al. [14] introduced the active attack model.
An adversary can actively select an arbitrary set of target
actors, creates a small number of new actors with edges
connecting to these targeted users, and then creates a
pattern of links among the new actors. By planting new
actors and connection patterns in the anonymized social
network sophisticatedly, the adversary is able to identify
the new actors as well as the targeted actors if the gener-
ated connection patterns are uniquely stand out in the
anonymized network. Theoretically, the creation of
Oð ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃlognp Þnodes in an n-node network will begin com-
promising the privacy of the arbitrary targeted nodes.
Backstorm et al., [14] further divided the active attacks
into walk-based attack and cut-based attack. Both of
them employed the strategy of inserting nodes into the
target network and then link these nodes with the target
nodes. The difference between them is the theoretical
number of nodes used in the attack.
Passive attacks
Backstorm et al. [14] also investigated the passive attack
model, where adversaries do not create any new nodes
or edges. Backstorm et al. pointed out that attacker with
certain knowledge can easily differentiate the target
nodes or edges from the others due to their unique
structural information. Most current studies focus their
research on preventing passive attacks, which includes:
(1) node passive attack [8-11], where adversaries are
supposed to take advantage of node’s degree centrality
information to uncover node’s identity; (2) edge passive
attack [13-15], where adversaries are supposed to knowthe existence of certain edges, leading to the disclosure
of sensitive information by tracking the identify of other
edges or nodes via known edges; (3) sub-graph passive
attack [9,11,12], where adversaries are supposed to make
use of sub-graph information known in advanced to
identify sensitive information of node, such as node
identity; (4) graph metrics passive attack [16], where the
adversaries have certain background knowledge of the
graph metrics, for example hub fingerprint, closeness
centrality or betweenness centrality. With the knowledge
of these graph metrics, it’s also possible that adversaries
can uncover several sensitive information of the social
network.
Privacy preservation models and algorithms
In the recent years, a number of approaches for preserving
privacy of relational data have been studied extensively,
which include k-anonymity [17,18], l-diversity[19], Perso-
nalized anonymity[20], and (α,k)-Anonymity[21]. One
common objective of these algorithms is to ensure every
node is indistinguishable to other (k-1) nodes after anon-
ymization. Although these methods work well in relational
table data, most of them cannot deal with social network
data due to the complex structure of social network and
various background and attack model employed by an ad-
versary. In the recent years, a few research groups have
investigated the privacy preservation of social network
data. They preserve the data privacy mainly by three
approaches: perturbation-based approach, generalization-
based approach, and protocol-based approach. Different
techniques correspond to different type of sensitive data
as well as privacy requirement.
Perturbation-based technique
The perturbation-based technique perturbs a social net-
work by adding, deleting or switching edges in a social
network in order to increase the difficulty of identifying a
node. Most of them are using greedy algorithm guided by
an objective function to modify the social network step by
step until the anonymized network satisfied some given
conditions. Liu and Terzi proposed the K-degree An-
onymous Algorithm to ensure that each network node is
indistinguishable to other (K-1) nodes [10]. Starting from
the original degree sequence d of input graph G, the
algorithm constructs a new degree sequence d^ which
satisfies two conditions including: d^ is k-anonymous andP
i dðiÞ  d^ðiÞ
  is minimized. Zhou and Pei proposed the
K-neighborhood Algorithm to make sure that node iden-
tity cannot be re-identified by an adversary with a confi-
dence larger than 1/k, even though the adversary has
background knowledge of the neighborhood graph [12].
The whole process is divided into two phases. First, the al-
gorithm extracts the neighborhoods of all nodes in the
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hoods of different nodes, the researchers proposed a
neighborhood component coding technique to represent
the neighborhoods in a concise way. In the second step,
the algorithm greedily organizes nodes into groups and
anonymizes the neighborhoods of nodes in the same
group. The greedy algorithm is guided by an anonymiza-
tion cost which is measured by the similarity between the
neighborhoods of two nodes. Ying and Wu proposed the
Spectrum Preserving Algorithm which preserves the priv-
acy by randomly perturbing edges in the network [16].
The whole process can be divided into three steps: at first,
the eigenvalues of the input graph is computed; and then
based on some proved theorems, the boundaries of eigen-
values are given; finally the algorithm perturbs the graph
by adding, deleting or switching edges of the graph. If the
eigenvalues of perturbed graph is within the given bound-
aries, the perturbation is accepted and continued for next
perturbation. The algorithm terminates until the precon-
dition is satisfied.
Generalization-based technique
The generalization-based technique preserves a social
network by grouping certain number of nodes or edges
together and then only release the general information
of the groups of nodes or edges. Nodes within a group
cannot be differentiated because they all share exactly
the same properties of the group. In most cases, a
generalization-based technique divides nodes according
to some predefined loss functions. Hay et al. proposed a
node splitting-based technique to achieve k-anonymity
of the social network [9,11]. Starting from a single parti-
tion of a social network, the algorithm keeps on splitting
the selected partition into two sub-groups until all pre-
defined criteria are satisfied. Similarly, Campan and
Truta introduced a node clustering-based approach to
satisfy the k-anonymity requirement and minimize the
information loss [8]. In their algorithm, clusters are cre-
ated one at a time. To form a new cluster, a node in V
with the maximum degree but not yet be allocated to
any cluster is selected as a seed for the new cluster.
Then the algorithm puts nodes to this currently pro-
cessed cluster until it reaches the desired cardinality k.
At each step, the current cluster grows with one node.
The selected node should not be assigned to any cluster
yet but it should be able to minimize the growth of in-
formation loss of the current clusters. Zheleva and
Getoor proposed an edge clustering-based technique to
hide the sensitive information on edges [13]. Their tech-
nique is divided into two phases. In the first phase, the
technique provides a clustering of the nodes into m
equivalence class (C1,C2,. . .,CM) such that each node is
indistinguishable in its quasi-identifying attributes from
K-1 other nodes. In the second step, this work presentsseveral techniques to protect sensitive information of
the social network and then compare their performance,
which includes partial-edge removal, cluster-edge anon-
ymization, and cluster-edge anonymization with con-
straints. Cormode and Srivastava proposed the safe
groupings technique for a bipartite Graph G= (V,W,E),
where V and W correspond to two types of objects [15].
In their work, a safe grouping of a bipartite graph parti-
tions nodes into groups such that two nodes of the same
group of V have no common neighbors in W and vice
versa. A greedy algorithm is proposed to find K safe
groups of V and L safe groups of W. For each node u,
the algorithm attempts to assign u to the first group
with fewer than n nodes. If it makes the grouping unsafe,
the algorithm will try the second available group and so
forth. If there is no group that meets the requirements, a
new group will be created to contain this node. After
getting K safe groups of V, the algorithm move forward
to find L safe groups of W following a similar same
process.
Protocol-based technique
The protocol-based technique is using the encryption ap-
proach rather than anonymizing the social network data.
Social network data is encrypted by following a protocol be-
fore sharing with other parties. The protocol ensures that
other parties are only able to obtain the insensitive informa-
tion for their applications but the sensitive information is
preserved. Frikken and Golle proposed the pieces assem-
bling approach for private social network analysis [22].
Summary
In this section, we provide a summary of the literature
by comparing the privacy preservation techniques and
the preserving data in social network as shown in
Table 1. In general, some privacy preservation techni-
ques are developed for preserving specific information
but are not applied to other information. The choice of
the privacy preservation techniques also depends on the
application of social network analysis.
Research problem
The existing works focus on preserving privacy of social
network data for data publishing so that the global net-
work structure can be analyzed. However, it has not con-
sidered how to integrate social network data from
different sources so that social network analysis and
mining can be conducted on the integrated data and yet
the privacy of the shared data can be preserved. Individ-
ual published social network data only capture parts of
the complete social network. Unless we can integrate
multiple social networks and conduct SNAM on the
integrated social network, the utility of the anonymized
data is still limited. Given multiple law enforcement
Table 1 Classification of privacy preservation techniques based on sensitive information
Types of sensitive information
Node Node Link Link Subgraph Aggregated Other
Existence Properties Existence Properties Property Graph property Graph information
Privacy preservation
techniques
Perturbation [10] [16] [16]
Based
Technique
Generalization [4,6] [8,9,11] [4,6,15] [8]
Based
Technique
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which captures a partial picture of a complete criminal
social network, the objective of this work is preserving
the privacy of the shared data from each law enforce-
ment unit and conduct SNAM tasks on the integrated
data. In this section, we first define formally the research
problem, introduce what sensitive information to pre-
serve, what insensitive information to share and what
SNAM task can be conducted. Then, we proposed a re-
search framework to address the research problem.Problem definition
Given a set of network ℊ= {G1, G2,. . .,Gn} in a distribu-
ted setting where each organization i owns its piece of
Gi, assuming the complete network GðG ¼ [ni¼1Gi ) is
unknown to each individual organization, the goal of this
paper is to study how to anonymize each Gi into G0i so
that: 1) the sensitive identities of Gi can be protected; 2)
G0i can be shared with other organizations and the inte-
grated anonymization graph G
0 ðG0 ¼ [ni¼1G0i can be used
for SNAM task. Concretely, each network G0i consists of
both insensitive nodes and sensitive nodes. Node iden-
tities of those insensitive nodes are known to the public
or the sharing parties while the node identities of those
sensitive nodes are unknown to the public and needed
to be protected. Our focus in this paper is to protect the
node identities of those sensitive nodes. On the other
hand, for SNAM purpose, some network properties, in-
cluding topology, diameter and some other abstract fea-
tures of the anonymized network, will be released and
shared across organizations. Last but not least, it’s im-
portant to note that some network features cannot be
preserved in our method, such as neighborhood infor-
mation. Therefore, not all SNAM tasks can be achievedin our integrated anonymized network. In this paper, we
only study how to preserve the usefulness of the inte-
grated anonymized network regarding to distance-related
analysis, such as computing the closeness of each node.
To summarize, although some existing works have studied
how to anonymize network for data publishing, the re-
search problem that we study here is different. We not
only anonymize a given network to protect its’ node iden-
tity but also focus on integrating anonymized networks to
achieve better SNAM resultsFramework of social network integration with privacy
preservation
To further motivate our research framework, we assume
organization P (OP) has a social network GP and
organization Q (OQ) has another social network GQ,
both GP and GQ are partial networks of a complete so-
cial network which is unknown to any organization. OP
needs to conduct a Social Network Analysis and Mining
(SNAM) but GP is incomplete due to its limited sources
of information. As a result, it will be difficult or even im-
possible for OP to get accurate SNAM results. If there is
no privacy concern between different organizations, one
can integrate GP and GQ to generate an integrated G
and obtain a better SNAM result. However, due to priv-
acy concern, OQ cannot share GQ completely with OP,
but only shares the insensitive information of GQ with
OP according to the privacy policies. At the same time,
OP does not need all data from OQ but only those that
are critical for the SNAM tasks. For these reasons, to in-
tegrate social networks of different organizations with-
out violating privacy policies, we only need to share
information that is critical to the performance of SNAM
and yet preserve the sensitive information.
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network integration for SNAM. In this framework, OQ
employs sub-graph generalization techniques to create a
generalized social network, GQ’, from GQ without violat-
ing the privacy policy. The generalized social network
only contains generalized information of GQ without re-
leasing any sensitive information. For example, a gener-
alized social network cannot release the exact identity of
each nodes or exact shortest distance between any two
nodes. On the other hand, generalized information can
include diameter of a sub-graph, average number of ad-
jacent nodes between two subgroups, degree of an in-
sensitive node and other insensitive information. The
generalized social network GQ’ will then be integrated
with GP to support a social network analysis and mining
task. Given the generalized information from GQ, it is
expected to achieve better performance on SNAM task
than conducting the analysis and mining on GP alone.
There are two important sub-tasks in our proposed
framework which we will address in the following
sections:Task 1 Given a social network G with sensitive informa-
tion, produce generalized social network G’ and deter-
mine the generalized information which can be released.Task 2 Integrate a generalized social network with the
local social network, and then utilize shared generalized
information to achieve better SNAM results.Notations
In Table 2, we define a set of notations for the proposed
social network integration techniques.Figure 1 General framework of social network integration for SNAM.Methodology
Social network generalization
In task one, given a social network G with sensitive in-
formation, we employ clustering-based technique to pro-
duce a generalized social network G’. We suppose
G= (V, E), where V is a set of nodes, E is a set of edges
and |V| = n, K of these nodes are insensitive nodes, and
n-K of these nodes are sensitive nodes. We generate a
generalized social network in two steps. In the first step,
we decompose G into K sub-graphs Gi = (Vi,Ei), where
V=Ui =1toK Vi and each sub-graph contains one insensi-
tive node. In the second step, each sub-graph will be
transformed to a generalized node of the generalized
graph G’. Furthermore, two generalized nodes will be con-
nected in G’ if and only if there is one or more edges con-
necting nodes from these two sub-graphs respectively.
In this section, we propose two graph partition algo-
rithms, K-nearest neighbor (KNN) method and Edge
betweenness based (EBB) method, to generate a general-
ized social network G’ for sharing purpose. Both KNN
and EBB methods are developed by following one com-
mon principle that the identity of insensitive nodes can
be published safely while the identity of sensitive nodes
cannot, so that, to produce a generalized social network,
we need to divide the original network into several sub-
graphs each of which represented by an insensitive
nodes, and the final generalized network should be also
represented by these insensitive nodes.K-nearest neighbor (KNN) method
Given a social network G with K insensitive nodes
vc1; v
c
2; . . . ; v
c
k KNN method divides G into K sub-graphs
by assigning each node v to its nearest insensitive node.
Let SPD(v, vi
C) be the distance of the shortest path be-
tween v and vi
C. Starting from the sensitive nodes
Table 2 Notations and definitions
G= (V, E) a social network G with |V| nodes and |E| edges
V node set of G
E edge set of G
G0 a generalized version of G
Gi= (Vi, Ei) a sub-graph of G where V=[i=1 to k Vi and Ei ⊂ E
vci the center of a sub-graph Gi which is an insensitive node too
vp node p
Num(Gi) The number of nodes in Gi
Num(Gi,Gj) the number of nodes in Gi that are adjacent to another subgraph Gj
SPD(vp,vq,Gi) the distance of the shortest path between nodes vp and vq in Gi
SPD(v, viC ) the distance of the shortest path between v and viC in Gi
Prob(SPD(.)=β)The probability of the distance that equals to β
S_SPD(Gi) shortest length of the shortest paths between any two nodes in Gi (S_SP
D(Gi) = {SP
D(vm,vn,Gi)| 8 vp, vq 2Vi, SPD(vm,vn,Gi)≤ SPD(vp,vq,Gi)})
L_SPD(Gi) longest length of the shortest paths between any two nodes in Gi (L_SP
D(Gi)= {SP
D(vm,vn,Gi)| 8 vp, vq 2Vi, SPD(vm,vn,Gi)≥ SPD(vp,vq,Gi)})
S_SPD(vi
C,Gi) shortest length of the shortest paths between vi










C,Gi) longest length of the shortest paths between vi
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tive node, one node per time, to the closest sub-graph
Gi where SP
D(v, vi
C) is shorter than or equal to SPD(v, vj
C)
where j= 1, 2, .., K and j 6¼ i. After dividing a social net-
work into K sub-graphs, we collapse all nodes of a sub-
graph into one generalized node, and represent this node
with the identity of the insensitive node of this sub-
graph. Finally, for each possible pair of generalized
nodes, say Gi and Gj in the generalized graph G’, an edge
will be created if and only if there is one or more edges
between any two nodes in G from sub-graph Gi and Gj
respectively.
Figure 2 presents a simple example to illustrate the
idea of KNN and show how it works to produce general-
ized social network. Figure 2 (a) is the given social net-
work which has seven nodes. Among them, v1 and v2
are insensitive nodes while the others are all sensitive
nodes. By using KNN method, the given social network
will be divided into two isolated social networks as
shown in Figure 2 (b). Finally, one sub-graph is repre-
sented by v1 and another sub-graph is represented by v2,








Figure 2 Illustrations of generating subgraphs.network where two generalized nodes are connected to-
gether because v4 and v5 are connected in G. The KNN
subgraph generation algorithm is presented below:
length = 1;
V =V - {v1
C, v2
C, . . . vK
C};
While V 6¼
For each vj 2 V









For each (vi,vj) 2 E
IF(Subgraph(vi) == Subgraph(vj))
//Subgraph(vi) is the subgraph such that vi 2
Subgraph(vi)
Gk= Subgraph(vi)
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Create an edge between Subgraph(vi) and
Subgraph(vj) and add it to E’
End For
Edge betweenness based (EBB) method
Instead of assigning sensitive nodes to the closest sub-
graphs represented by insensitive nodes, the EBB
method progressively remove edges with the highest
betweenness and it also ensure that each separated sub-
graph contains exactly one insensitive node. The
betweenness of an edge is defined as the number of
shortest paths between pairs of nodes that pass through
it. If a network consists of a few of dense communities
which are only loosely connected by some inter-
community edges, these inter-community edges will
have high betweenness, so that removing them will nat-
urally break the social network into multiple communi-
ties. The EBB algorithm is presented as follows:
//EBB(G), Edge Betweenness Based method
Initialize e = {};
While(there are more than one insensitive node in
graph G)
Identify edge (vi,vj) in G which is not an element of e
and has the highest betweenness;
Remove (vi,vj) from G;
IF(G is still connected after removing edges (vi,vj))
EBB(G);
ELSE IF (G is disconnected and split to two graph
Gp and Gq)
IF(No insensitive node in Gp) or (No insensitive
node in Gq)
Add (vi,vj) back to G;
e = e + (vi,vj);





//Add edge between generalized node to form
generalized graph





Create an edge between Subgraph(vi) and
Subgraph(vj) and add it to E’
End For
Figure 3 shows an example of how EBB method works
to produce generalized social network. Given a social
network with nine nodes, v1 and v2 are insensitive nodeswhile all other nodes are sensitive nodes. Since edge (v1, v2)
has the highest Betweenness and it is safe to be removed,
EBB method delete this edge to form two separated sub-
graphs each of them contains exactly one insensitive node,
as shown in Figure 3 (b). Finally, the EBB method gener-
alizes these two sub-graphs into two generalized nodes,
and then connects them to form the generalized graph as
shown in Figure 3 (c).
Generalized sub-graph information
Given a generalized social network Gi and its center vi
C,
we select shareable network properties based on the in-
formation need and the privacy policy. In this paper, we
treat node identity as sensitive information that we
should protect, and consider distance between nodes to
be useful information for SNAM task. Let va and vb be
any two nodes in Gi and the length of the shortest path
between va and vb be SP
D(vp,vq,Gi). We define the long-
est length of the shortest paths between any two nodes
in Gi, denoted by L_SP
D(Gi), as
LSPD Gið Þ ¼ fSPDðvm; vn;GiÞj∃vm; vn; 8va; vb∈Vi; SPD
 vm; vn;Gið Þ≥SPD va; vb;Gið Þg
We also define the shortest length of the shortest
paths between any two nodes in Gi, denoted by S_SP
D
(Gi), as
SSPD Gið Þ ¼ fSPD vm; vn;Gið Þj∃vm; vn; 8va; vb∈Vi; SPD
 vm; vn;Gið Þ≤SPD va; vb;Gið Þg
To reduce the risk of releasing sensitive information,
instead of sharing exact information of shortest path, we
propose to share the expected length between two nodes
within a generalized social network. Formally speaking,
the length of any shortest paths in Gi, α, must be smaller
or equal to L_SPD(Gi) and larger or equal to S_SP
D(Gi),
where S_SPD(Gi)≤ α≤ L_SP
D(Gi). We compute and share
the probability of the length of the shortest path be-
tween any two nodes in Gi, denoted as Prob(SP
D(Gi) = α),
and 0≤ Prob(SPD(Gi) = α)≤ 1
Similarly, let the length of the shortest path between
va and vi
C, be SPD(va,vi
C,Gi). We define the longest length
of the shortest paths between vi
C and other nodes within










We also define the shortest length of the shortest
paths between vi
C and other nodes within Gi, denoted by
and S_SPD(vi
C,Gi), as
   
(a) (b) (c)
V1 V1 V2V2 V2V1
Figure 3 Illustrations of generalizing subgraph byEBB.
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Since the length of shortest paths between vi
C and any
D Cother nodes in Gi must be smaller or equal to L_SP (vi ,
Gi) and larger or equal to S_SP
D(vi
C, Gi), denoted as
S_SPD(vi
C, Gi) ≤ β ≤ L_SP
D(vi
C, Gi). We compute the
probability of the length of the shortest path between
any node and vi
C, Prob(SPD(vi
C,Gi) = β), where 0≤ Prob
(SPD(Gi) = α)≤ 1.
We also denote Num(Gi) as the number of nodes in Gi
and Num(Gi,Gj) as the number of nodes in Gi that are
adjacent to another subgraph Gj.
The generalized subgraph information for sharing









(vii) Num(Gi), and (viii) Num(Gi,Gj).
Generalized graph integration and social network analysis
In section 4.2 and 4.3 we introduced how to divide a so-
cial network into sub-graphs, and then generalize these
sub-graphs to nodes, then finally produce a generalized
social network. We also discussed what kind of informa-
tion will be shared along with the generalized social net-
work. In this section, given a generalized social network
G’ and the shareable information of the sub-graphs of G’,
we propose our own techniques to integrate social net-
work and shared information to improve the perform-
ance of SNAM task.
Suppose organization Op has a social network Gp and
organization OQ has another social network GQ, Op
wants to integrate GQ with its own Gp to compute more
accurate closeness centrality. We propose to achieve this
goal without violating the privacy policies in three steps:
(1) produce generalized social network G0p and G
0
Q ; (2)
integrate G0p and G
0
Q into GIntegrated; (3) estimate the dis-
tance between any two nodes of the integrated social
network. Among these three steps, step one can be
achieved by our proposed techniques in section 4.2 and
4.3. In step two, although the sub-graphs represented by
a common insensitive node in G0p and G
0
Q are different
and the connectivity between these insensitive nodes are
also different, according to our proposed techniques, G0pand G0Q are represented by the same group of insensitive
nodes since Gp and GQ share same insensitive nodes. As
a result, we can combine G0p and G
0
Q into GIntegrated by
taking union of their edges. In this section, we focus on
the step 3 which estimate distances between any two
nodes based on Gp, GIntegrated and shared information of
sub-graphs of G0Q.
To re-estimate the distance between two nodes vi and
vp of Gp by making use of GIntegrated and the shared in-
formation of sub-graphs of G0Q , we first identify the two
closest insensitive nodes for vi and vj in Gp, and then use
GIntegrated and the generalized information of G0Q to re-
estimate their distances. Formally speaking, let the clos-
est insensitive node to vi in Gp be VCA , and the second
closest insensitive node to vi in Gp be VCA . We set the










 þ SPD vi; vcA0;GP  ;
with λA þ λA0 ¼ 1 and the weight of the closest insensi-
tive node is higher.
Similarly, let the closest insensitive node to vj in GP be
vCA , and the second closest insensitive node to vj in GP be










 þ SPD vj; vcB0;GP  ;
with λB þ λB0 ¼ 1




B , and v
C
B0 are the centers of gen-
eralized sub-graphs GA, GA, GB, and GB, respectively.
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integrating the estimated distances of the four possible
paths going through these insensitive nodes by a linear
combination with weights equal to λα× λb.
D (vi, vj) is the estimated distance between vi and vj on
the path going through vca and v
c
b , where a can be A or
A’ and b can be B or B’.
D vi; vj
  ¼ D0 Ga; við Þ þ 1þ
P
8Gk







where Gk is a generalized node on the shortest path be-
tween Gα and Gb in GIntegrated If a 6¼ b which means vi
and vj are not in the same subgraph, then D(vi, vj) is
estimated by D0ðGa; viÞ;D0ðGb; vjÞ, and E(Gk). Otherwise,
if vi and vj are in the same subgraph then a= b. In this
case, D (vi, vj) is estimated by D00ðvi; vjÞ.D0ðGa; viÞ corre-
sponds to the expected length of the distance between vi
and the sub-graph gatekeeper within Gα. Similarly,
D0ðGb; vjÞ corresponds to the expected length of the dis-
tance between vj and the sub-graph gatekeeper within
Gb. In addition, E (Gk) is the expected length of the dis-
tance between any two nodes of sub-graph Gk that the
shortest path between vi and vj is going through. If vi is
not the same as vca;D
0ðGa; viÞ is computed by E (Gα) and
the percentage of nodes in Ga that is adjacent to the
sub-graph that is immediately following Ga in the short-
est path between vi and vj in GIntegrated. If vi is the same
as vca;D
0ðGa; viÞ is equal to the expected length of the
distance between the insensitive node, vca , to the other
nodes in Ga. Computation of D0ðGb; viÞ is done similarly.
D












where NumðGa;Gk ÞNumðGaÞ is the percentage of nodes in Gα as a
gatekeeper which is adjacent to Gk and Gk is the sub-
graph that immediately follows Gα in the shortest path
between vi and vj in GIntegrated.
E (Gk) represents the expected length of the distance
between any two nodes of the sub-graph Gk, which is
computed as:
E Gkð Þ ¼
XLSPðGkÞ
α¼SSPðGkÞ
ðProbðSPDðGkÞ ¼ αÞ  α
D” (vi,vj) corresponds to the estimated distance between





λa  λb  Dðvi; vjÞgraph. In this case, if any of vi or vj is the same as vca , D”
(vi,vj) should equal to the expected length of the distance
from the insensitive node to the other nodes in,Gα. Other-
wise, D” (vi,vj) should equal to the expected length of the












Practically, there isn’t any intelligence unit has a complete
terrorist social network but each of them has a partial ter-
rorist social network. The objective of this work is to sup-
port these intelligence units to share their social networks
while preserving the sensitive information. In this section,
we investigated our proposed techniques on a real-world
dataset of terrorists. We extracted several social networks
from the terrorist dataset to simulate the real-world prob-
lem. Intensive experiment was conducted under different
settings to evaluate our proposed techniques.
Dataset
In this work, we employed the Global Salafi Jihad terror-
ist social network, denoted as G, in our experiment. The
Global Salafi Jihad terrorist social network consists of
366 nodes (terrorists) and 1,275 edges (connection be-
tween terrorists)[23]. These terrorists come from four
major groups, including Central Staff of al Qaeda (CSQ),
Core Arab (CA), Southeast Asia (SA), and Maghreb
Arab (MA). We randomly sample α percent of nodes
from the Global Salafi Jihad terrorist social network as
insensitive nodes, that their identities are known by all
organizations. Suppose there are two independent orga-
nizations OP and OQ, we simulate GP for OP by ran-
domly removing β percent of edges from the Global
Salafi Jihad terrorist social network. Similarly, we ran-
domly remove β percent of edges from the Global Salafi
Jihad terrorist social network to simulate GQ for OQ. As
a result, both GP and GQ are partial graph of G. More-
over, GP are different from GQ in terms of their edges.
Evaluation
As discussed before, there is no generic approach for
privacy preservation since sensitive information can be
defined in various ways. Moreover, shareable useful in-
formation is also different in terms of different SNAM
tasks. In this work, we treat node identity as sensitive in-
formation and consider distance between nodes as useful
information that we want to maintain. To evaluate our
proposed technique, we assume that the SNAM task
conducted by GP is to compute closeness centrality for
each node. If GP is close to G, then distances between
any two nodes in GP should be roughly equal to their
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http://www.security-informatics.com/content/1/1/7distance in G, leading to similar closeness centrality for
each node. Otherwise, nodes in GP should have different
closeness centrality in G. In this work, closeness central-
ity for a node in GP is computed as:
closeness centralityGP við Þ ¼
n 1Pn
j¼1;i 6¼jSPðvi; vj;GPÞ
where n is the total number of nodes in GP.
Given a complete social network G and the integrated
social network GIntegrated, the performance of our pro-
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Figure 4 Average closeness centrality of complete graph (G), integrat
using KNN method ðG integratedðKNNÞÞ and incomplete graph GP: (a) α
(g) α=0.65, (h) α=0.75, (i) α=0.85, (j) α=0.95.Experiment
Figure 4 demonstrates the average closeness centrality of
nodes of original graph (G), integrated graph using EBB
method (GIntegrated (EBB)), integrated graph using KNN
method (GIntegrated (KNN)) and incomplete graph (GP).
In Figure 4, the blue line represents the average close-
ness centrality computed from G, which is a gold stand-
ard, so that the closer to this blue line the better it is.
For each α from 0.05 to 0.95, we increased β (percent-
age of edges randomly removed from G) from 0.2 to 0.8.
We observed that the performance of GP (GIntegrated
(KNN)) and (GIntegrated (EBB)) decreased consistently
when more edges are removed from the complete graph,
no matter what the value of α is. Although our proposed
technique integrates networks and estimates the average
closeness centrality, the performance will not be as good











































0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ed graph using EBB method ðG integratedðEBBÞÞ, integrated graph
= 0.05, (b) α=0.15, (c) α=0.25, (d) α=0.35, (e) α=0.45, (f) α=0.55
Tang and Yang Security Informatics 2012, 1:7 Page 12 of 14
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/1/1/7actual graph G. When more edges are removed before
integration (β increase), the performance will degrade.
We further investigated the performance of our pro-
posed technique by increasing the percentage of insensi-
tive nodes from 0.05 (Figure 4(a)) to 0.95 (Figure 4(j)).
Similar patterns are observed from 4(a) to 4(j). In terms
of average closeness centrality, increasing or decreasing
the percentage of insensitive nodes in network did not
make substantial impact to the performance of our pur-
posed technique. One plausible explanation is that: the
average closeness centrality used in this experiment only
reflects the performance of our approach in an abstract
level. Some nodes in the integrated network may have
higher closeness centrality than its original closeness
centrality in the complete graph while some nodes may
have lower closeness centrality in the integrated network
than in the complete graph. As a result, when we(a)
(b)
Figure 5 (a) error ratio of G integratedðKNNÞ with different settings of β
β and α.consider the average closeness centrality, the differences
may be offset by each other.
Figure 5 (a) presents the error ratio of (GIntegrated
(KNN)) with different α and β. Similarly, Figure 5 (b)
presents the error ratio of GIntegrated (EBB) with different
α and β. We compute the errors in closeness centrality
obtained from the networks with and without integra-
tion (Error(Gintegrated) and Error(Gp)) using the error
function defined in 5.2. and the error ratio is defined as:
ErrorðGPÞ  ErrorðGIntegratedÞ
ErrorðGPÞ
Different from the average closeness centrality which we
used as a measurement in Figure 4, the error function
accumulates the closeness centrality difference for eachand α; (b) error ratio of G integratedðEBBÞ with different settings of
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ness will not occur. The experiment results of Figure 5
can be used to verify our explanation to the Figure 4 in
the last paragraph.
The experiment results demonstrate that when α is
high (means more insensitive nodes), the improvement
of our proposed technique comparing to the partial
graph is also higher. The highest improvement was
achieved when α equals to 0.95. The improvement
decreased slowly along with the decrease of α. This ob-
servation indicated that our explanation of Figure 4 is
correct. With more insensitive nodes, the integrated net-
work will be closer to the original network so that the
improvement of our technique will be higher.
Last but not least, from both Figures 4 and 5, we do
not observe any significant differences of the perform-
ance between using KNN or EBB to produce generalized
network. However, as it is shown in section 4.2.2, the
EBB algorithm is dominated by the step of calculating
the edge betweenness which has time complexity O(N3).
On the other hand, KNN is much more efficient which
is only O(N). As a result, when the network size is huge,
KNN is preferred. Moreover, in a fully connected net-
work where several edges have the same betweenness
weight, EBB will take longer to produce the generalized
network. However, KNN also has its limitation. For ex-
ample, KNN starts from each insensitive node to look
for sensitive nodes in its neighborhood to form a sub-
graph step by step. However, the search process is not
fully simultaneous, but is controlled by a FOR loop. As a
result, the sequence in the FOR loop is matter, especially
for some nodes in the middle of two insensitive nodes.
As a result, the division of sub-graph by using KNN is
less natural than EBB method.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the privacy preservation tech-
niques for social network integration. We introduce a re-
search framework which consists of three major steps.
First of all, we propose the K-Nearest Neighborhood
method and the Edge Betweenness Based method to de-
compose a social network into multiple sub-graphs. Sec-
ondly, we propose techniques to generalize a social
network by sharing the probabilistic model of the general-
ized information. At third, we introduced the techniques
of social network integration and distance estimation.
Using the Global Salafi Jihad terrorist social network
as test bed, we thoroughly evaluated our proposed tech-
nique with different parameters and settings. The experi-
ment results demonstrated that an organization can
improve the accuracy of computing closeness centrality
by sharing and integrating generalized information. Our
proposed techniques were able to preserve the privacy
as well as increase the utility of the shared socialnetworks. We observed that KNN performed better than
EBB but did not have substantial difference. Moreover,
our proposed techniques were not sensitive to the num-
ber of insensitive node but relatively sensitive to the
number of removed edges.
In the future, we will continue to examine our techni-
ques in more datasets. We will explore other graph par-
tition models and integration techniques to improve the
performance of our technique. Moreover, we will also
extend our work to maintain other useful information
besides distance.
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